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strengthen its standing: 'The Government was weak and wanted to show that they counted for something, at any rate with the United Kingdom'.3 Despite the evident lack of enthusiasm on the British side, it was finally decided to hold a meeting in London on 23 July to discuss a European settlement. 'The object of this meeting will be to examine the situation and to consider how best to further the desire of the Three Powers to consolidate the peace of Europe by means of a general settlement.'4 It would seem from this that Blum's purpose in visiting London was not to discuss Spain.5 The news of the outbreak of the war, which reached him in Giral's telegram of 20 July requesting assistance, arrived when he was already preparing to go to London, and came as a complete surprise. His immediate sympathy went to the Republicans, as the legal government, but he was only too well aware of the dangers of translating this sympathy into concrete terms, dangers for both France and Europe. As he noted later: 'Was it possible for us to help the legal government of Spain without Hitler and Mussolini helping the rebels ?' 6 Nevertheless, he came swiftly to the decision to help. Between 20 and 22 July, in spite of the strong sympathy for Franco already being expressed on the Right, Blum, in collaboration with Delbos and Daladier, then Minister of Defence, drew up a plan for sending arms to Spain. This seems to be confirmed by a leak to the German Ambassador, Welczeck, who cabled to Berlin on 23 July: 'I have learned in strict confidence that the French Government declared itself prepared to supply the Spanish Government with considerable amounts of war material during the next few days. Approximately 30 bombers, several thousand bombs, a considerable number of 75 mm. guns etc., are involved.'7 The same evening Welczeck telephoned Berlin to say that this report had been confirmed. It is clear that before going to London, Blum had reached his decision on military aid to Spain, although for the moment it was known only to a restricted few. It is interesting to note here the differences in the various accounts of this last conversation. Eden himself in his memoirs does not record his words at the hotel, only underlining the fact that 'there was no discussion of the Spanish problem during our three-power meeting'.0l James Joll follows word for word the version of Blum himself, given at his trial. Jean Grandmougin, however, offers a version that is radically different. According to him, it was Baldwin and not Eden who asked Blum the question, and what Baldwin is reputed to have said is far from the noncommittal nature of Eden's reply, namely: 'That's your business; but in that case, do not count on us.'11 Cordell Hull follows Grandmougin, in that he also claims that it was Baldwin who spoke to Blum, and he stresses that Baldwin emphasized to Blum 'the British Government's views that any assistance to Spain by France might lead to an international crisis'.12 Here the notion of British pressure is introduced. Upon Blum's return to Paris, however, it was not British but French pressure that was immediately brought to bear. He was met at Le Bourget by Chautemps, who informed him that the decision to help the Republicans had become known to the National Assembly, causing considerable alarm: 'As soon as I returned from London, on 24 July, I found myself faced with a deep split in the government, a bitter press campaign, and a kind of parliamentary revolt.'13 Blum hurried to consult Herriot, who advised him in the strongest terms to be prudent: 'I beg you, my dear fellow', he said to me, 'I beg you, don't go and get yourself mixed up in that.' 14 It is generally admitted that the secret was betrayed by the military attache of the Spanish Embassy in Paris, whose sympathies lay with Franco, and who had given the information to Henri de Kerillis of L'Echo de Paris, who, in the course of a resounding campaign against Blum's action, published the details of the arrangements so far made.
The emotion aroused by the news, not only among the French generally, but more especially in the National Assembly, was so great that Blum believed his only course was to resign. At one moment, in full agreement with President Auriol, he was determined to do so. It appears that he was also prepared to put the question to the Assembly, although this would almost certainly have meant not only his own resignation, but the end of the Popular Front government. He was dissuaded from both courses by the arguments of Ximenes de Asua and Fernados de los Rios, representatives of the Spanish Republican government, who convinced him that the fall of the government 'would be a far more shattering moral blow to the Spanish Popular Front than the practical disadvantages caused by the loss of some material assistance'.15 Blum thereupon decided to stay, and to attempt to find some way of implementing his original decision while appeasing the violent emotions it had aroused. On 25 July he called the first cabinet meeting following his return. It revealed the division of opinion among the ministers; there was willingness to help the Spanish Republicans, but reluctance to deliver arms openly to Spain. It was decided to assign the material to Mexico, and to leave it to the discretion of the Mexican Government to put the material to use.16 The decision was largely influenced by awareness of the British Government's attitude. Regardless of what in fact took place, the mission was a total failure, a failure which was to have a marked influence on the decisions taken in Paris. It was in the light of Britain's refusal to support France in the event of a war following intervention -an important distinction between that and any refusal to support intervention itself-that Blum came to realize that a policy of nonintervention was the only possible one for France. In order to present a united stand with London, Blum reversed his original decision and embarked upon the course of non-intervention.
On 31 While it cannot be denied that the attitude of the British Government had considerable influence upon Blum's decision, it is clear that he failed to appreciate the appeal of a France willing to fight for her ideals. In increasing further the lack of national unity in France, in sapping the national morale by his policy, which in fact reflected the abdication of responsibility towards both Spain and the non-intervention agreement, Blum denied the people of France a real chance of asserting themselves and their nation on the European plane and of giving a lead to the men of ideals. As a journalist, contemporary of Blum, noted: 'Leon Blum is doing reluctantly but loyally what he judges to be best for peace. But history teaches us that it is always dangerous to turn one's back on justice, even with the best of intentions.'32
